changes in trade and exchange rate policy. These include: correction of overvalued exchange rates; improved price incentives for exports, including an increase in producer prices for primary commodity exports; lower and more uniform tariff protection for industry; reduced use of direct controls on imports. They admit that there are alternatives to devaluation, such as export subsidies or reduced export taxes, but prefer devaluation (combined with tariff reduction or relaxation of import restrictions) on the grounds that it has less of an adverse effect on the government budget, gives rise to a smaller administrative burden and eases the adjustment process (p 30). Bulktu,, 1983, vol 14 no 1, lnstitule of Development Studies, Sussex
The 'Fallacy of Composition' and Primary
Export Prospects
As far as agriculture and primary production are concerned, the Report points out that the volume of such exports has been nèarly stagnant or declining in most sub-Saharan African countries (SSA) during the 1970s. Agricultural exports for the region were no greater by the end of the 1970s that they had been in the early 1960s (p46). The Report's strategy requires a renewed rapid increase in the volume of primary exports. The 'fallacy of composition' inherent in this approach is examined in Stephany Griffith-Jones'
article. The Report's advice to increase the volume of exports of primary products may well be sensible if given to the government of a single small country, but not when it covers the whole region. In many cases, the proportion of world output accounted for by SSA (shown in Table 1 ) is large enough, given elasticities of demand, to mean that an increase in production would result in a fall in income from this source.
For example, SSA produces 84 per cent of the world's palm kernels, 69 per cent of cocoa, 56 per cent of sisal, 41 per cent of groundnut oil, 28 per cent of palm kernel oil, 28 per cent of coffee, 27 per cent of groundnuts and 19 per cent of tea. The beverages, coffee, tea and cocoa, which are among SSA's most important foreign exchange earners, are rendered particularly vulnerable by their low price and income elasticities of demand. Unless the increase in African production is part of an international quota agreement, it does not in such cases make sense.'
The Report verges on the disingenuous on this point. 'The slow growth of world demand for many primary commodities', it suggests, 'is not a valid argument [in favour of not increasing output of such commodities] 'This mistaken extrapolation from possible country options to general prescription is a most inappropriate one for the World Bank to make, Of all bodies, it should be most concerned with the impact of commodity export growth rates on their prices and total earnings for SSA as a region, indeed on all primary exports. However, in falling into this elementary 'fallacy of compositionS the Accelerated Development
Report is in the tradition of 1950s Bank country studies which routinely advised each country to raise its export volume rapidly by diversifying into other countries' major exports in order to avoid worsening terms of trade! prospects of raising foreign exchange earnings from primary production, purely as a matter of arithmetic, puts an enormous burden on industry. For instance, increase the volume of manufactured exports by at least 10 per cent per year (p 96). Since Kenya is cited, let us look in more detail at the prospects for its manufactured exports. As Table 2 shows, Kenya's performance over the past decade in this respect has been nothing short of disastrous. The annual rate of growth in earnings at current prices of manufactured exports (including even slightly processed products, but excluding fuel and lubricants based entirely on imported crude oil) was only 5.8 per cent between 1973 and 1980.
Since price inflation was over 14 per cent on average, this implies a substantial fall in the volume of Kenya's manufactured exports between 1973 and 1980, in spite of vigorous promotional efforts.
Prospects in Neighbouring Markets
As can be seen, over half of Kenya's manufactured As Tanzania and Uganda set up their own manufacturing facilities Kenyan exporters had to 2The mechanisms of a manufactured export sector led by surplus output of domestic market oriented import substitution industries are unlikely to be those of the export market centred industries believed to characterise NlCs. Table 2 Kenya's exports of manufactured goods 1973-80 switch products (for instance, from beer, soap, paint, bicycle tyres, footwear and matches to batteries, insulated wire, gramophone records and plastic products). Prior to the Community's final collapse it was becoming more and more difficult for Kenya to rely on keeping one step ahead to sustain export growth to these markets. The markets were growing more slowly; Tanzania and -until 1971 -Uganda were accelerating their own import substitution; and the cost of Kenya's new products relative to imports from elsewhere was increasing. A similar process affected other neighbouring markets as growth slowed and competition increased both from third countries and from their own import substituting industries.
Since the disintegration of the Community and closure of the Tanzanian border (which cut off land routes to the markets of Zambia and Burundi as well as that of Tanzania), the war and its aftermath in Uganda, and poor relations with Somalia have hampered the relief to existing massive industrial-economy unemployment. This means not only that markets for primary products are going to be growing even more slowly than usual, but also that the protectionist mood in industrialised countries is likely to be reinforced, and competition in third markets for manufactured goods to be increased. Secondly, the element of value added in what the Report recognises as often only 'slightly processed resources' is low. Thirdly, some kind of tie-in with a transnational corporation (TNC) is usually a precondition of penetrating European or American markets for these products. For example, Kenya exports soda ash through Imperial Chemical Industries and wattle extract through Lonrho. As Langdon [1980] points out, the Ivory Coast's (shortlived) success as an exporter of textiles to Europe was due to its French TNC connections. The Kenyan textile industry was unable to break into the European textile market partly because of its lack of a longstanding European TNC connection.4 The only promising case for Kenya in this respect is food processing.
With prospects in more distant markets so poor, the only African economies likely to achieve growth in manufactured exports are those able to establish a 'peripheral-centre' or 'Brazilian' role in relation to ' As neither Kenya nor the Ivory Coast is either self-sufficient in cotton nor a producer of synthetic or artificial staple fibre, it may be questioned whether these are actually resource based industries. If not, they fall under the general doubts expressed about cheap labour based manufactured export development. Marshallian external economies' [Singer 1950 ] is still valid. So is the emphasis of Chenery [1955] and Scitovsky [1954] on the dynamic external economies enjoyed by an industry as a result of cost reductions or demand increases in other sectors. Such externalities make it dangerous to proceed as if future factor supplies were given, rather than the consequence of current resource allocation, and to plan in terms of static rather than dynamic comparative advantage.
Certainly there is a case that most direct controls on imports (particularly the Kenyan version which hands control of the controls over to monopolistic companies) should be removed.6 The small size of the market means, however, that tariffs on imported goods which are produced locally will have to be high initially, with a phased programme of reduction to allow survival and growth of productivity overtime. It is possible that the authors of the Report would agree with this. 'Sooner or later most countries will also have to increase manufactured exports to maintain industrial growth, expand employment opportunities and diversify exports' (p 95). Quite so. But in Africa it has to be later rather than sooner.
The 28 per cent rate of increase in manufactured exports implied by the arithmetic of the Bank's strategy is totally unrealistic. Even the 10 per cent rate of increase actually proposed for a handful of 6This is not inconsistent with accepting overall macro import limits. These could be enforced by means other than product by product licensing.
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countries is not feasible. In this important respect the strategy has its sums wrong and needs to be re-thought.
